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Abstract
In this paper we consider Epistemic Logic Programs, which extend Answer Set Programming (ASP) with
“epistemic operators”, and a recent approach to the semantics of such programs in terms of World Views.
We propose some observations on the existence and number of world views. We exploit an extended ASP
semantics in order to: (i) provide a novel characterization of world views; (ii) query world views and query
the whole set of world views. This paper is under consideration for acceptance in TPLP
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1 Introduction
Answer Set Programming (ASP) is a successful logic programming paradigm under the answer
set semantics (AS) (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1988; Gelfond and Lifschitz 1991). ASP has been ap-
plied, e.g., to information integration, constraint satisfaction, routing, planning, diagnosis, con-
figuration, computer-aided verification, biology/biomedicine, knowledge management, etc. (cf.
(Brewka et al. 2016) and the references therein). The ASP approach to problem-solving consists
basically in the following: (i) encoding of the given problem via an ASP program; (ii) computing
the “answer sets” of such a program via an inference engine, or “ASP solver”; (iii) extracting the
problem solutions by examining such answer sets; in fact, answer set contents can be in general
reformulated in order to present the solution in terms of the given problem.
Epistemic Logic programs (ELPs), first introduced in (Gelfond and Przymusinska 1991), ex-
tend ASP with epistemic operators K and M: KA means that (ground) atom A is true in every
answer set of given program Π, whereas MA means that A is true in some of the answer sets
of Π. Thus, such operators introduce a form of reasoning over multiple answer sets, where the
collection of all the answer sets ofΠ is called a world view and, if M and K occur inΠ, more than
one world view may exist. The epistemic negation operator not expresses thatA is not provably
true, meaning that A is false in at least one answer set of Π. By means of not one can define
both K and M: in fact, KA and MA can be rephrased as not not A and not notA, respectively,
where not is ASP standard ‘default negation’. In fact: concerning K, if it is not true that A is
false in some answer set then A must be true in all of them; concerning M, if notA is false in
some answer set thenAmust be true in that answer set. Consequently, many approaches to ELPs,
e.g., (Shen and Eiter 2016), consider explicitly only the operator not. The semantics of ELPs is
provided in terms ofWorld Views: instead of a unique set of answer sets like in ASP, there is now
a set of such sets. Each one, called “world view”, consistently satisfies the epistemic expressions
that appear in a given program. An epistemic logic program may have several world views. ELP
solving systems have been defined and implemented (Son et al. 2017) on top of state-of-the-art
ASP solvers, that are invoked (more than once) to generate and check potential world views.
In this paper we refer to the work of (Shen and Eiter 2016) concerning the “general epistemic
semantics” of ELPs. Many other semantic approaches/characterizations have been introduced,
among which the following: (Gelfond 2011; Truszczynski ), (del Cerro et al. 2015; Su 2017),
(Kahl and Leclerc 2018; Su 2019; Cabalar et al. 2019a; Cabalar et al. 2019b); the aim is essen-
tially to avoid unintended world views, but also to propose extensions of the basic paradigm.
We consider the semantics introduced in (Shen and Eiter 2016) because: it takes properly into
account previous relevant work, and copes in a satisfactory way with most of the controversial
examples; moreover, a “plus” of this approach is that it provides a very general characterization
of world views, which is applicable to every variant of the AS semantics. Concerning practical
applicability, the work of (Bichler et al. 2018) introduces an effective method for the practical
characterization and computation of world views under the semantics of (Shen and Eiter 2016).
The traditional example proposed in the literature to illustrate and motivate the use of not is a
re-elaboration of a famous example by Bowen and Kowalski (Bowen and Kowalski 1983):
innocent(X )← suspect(X ), not demo(guilty(X )).
stating that one is innocent if (s)he cannot be proved to be guilty (clearly,X will be instantiated
to some constant defined elsewhere in the program, say john). This example was formulated to
support the introduction of prolog metainterpreters to implement the demo predicate. However,
it can be reasonable to assume the adoption of ASP to encode available knowledge about the
underlying investigative case: in fact, this knowledge (collected by investigators) can often be
incomplete, uncertain, etc. If using ASP however, a formulation such as
innocent(X )← suspect(X ), not guilty(X ).
does not suffice, as there can be answer sets where the suspect is deemed innocent and others
where (s)he is deemed guilty, thus not allowing a unique conclusion to be drawn. By exploiting
epistemic negation the formulation becomes the following:
innocent(X )← suspect(X ), not guilty(X ).
In particular, it states that one is innocent if not provably guilty: i.e., (s)he innocent if there
exists some answer set where (s)he is not guilty. In fact, the existence of such an answer set
introduces a reasonable doubt. In Section 7 we provide and discuss a simple though plausible
underlying description of the case at hand where, due to uncertain knowledge (that in practical
investigations occurs very often) the resulting ELP program has more than one world view.
Our Contributions:
1. We propose some observations about programs with epistemic negation, and in particular
on the existence and number of world views.
2. We introduce epistemic scenarios that are easy to obtain, and among which are the valid
guesses, i.e., the hypotheses about the truth value of epistemic literals that determine world
views. We establish, for the first time in the literature, an upper bound on the number of
valid guesses (and thus of world views). This is of theoretical interest, as no estimation of
the number of world views had ever been provided before. Also, the notion of epistemic
scenarios reduces (in many cases very significantly) the number of guesses to be checked
for validity in order to be able to compute world views.
2
3. We define a new method to check validity of a guess, which is particularly convenient
when the given program contains few epistemic literals.
4. We provide for the first time in the literature a device for top-down (prolog-style) query-
answering concerning either a single world view, or also the whole set of world views,
which does not require to compute the world views beforehand.
Querying world views may be useful in reference to the above example, as an investiga-
tor/lawyer/judge may wish to pose a query about john without computing a whole world view.
Moreover, in case several world views exist, the involved parties may wish to query whether john
is innocent/guilty in some/every world view. We in fact provide several operators to query world
views of given ELP program. notWA means that not A holds in some world view of Π, KWA
means that A is true in every world view (where, according to (Shen and Eiter 2016), A is true
in a world view if A belongs to all the answer sets that compose the world view). MWA means
that A is possible in at least one world view (i.e., A belongs to at least one of the composing
answer sets). An enhanced MW can check whether A is possible in every world view. NOTA is
a shorthand for ¬MA, meaning that A is false in every answer set of a world view and NOTW A
means falsity of A in every answer set of every world view. The usefulness of these operators
will be illustrated in Section 7 where we further elaborate on the above example.
In general terms, the possibility of querying world views may have significant practical ap-
plications, for instance in Intelligent Agents1, recommender systems, decision support systems:
such systems might employ answer set modules for reasoning tasks (Costantini 2011), and might
prefer to receive answers to queries rather that having to inspect all the answer sets/world views.
Notice that: query-answering might be simulated by suitable APIs defined on top of a full
world-view computation. However, this would not be resilient to modifications of a program’s
knowledge base, as each modification would require to recompute the world views. Our query-
answering facility does not need to compute full world views, and new queries automatically
consider the updated knowledge. This is important in evolving systems such as, e.g., agents.
We resort to Resource-basedAnswer Set Semantics (RAS, cf. (Costantini and Formisano 2015))
for formalizing the proposed new characterization of world views. RAS provides answer sets to
all programs, including those which are inconsistent under AS. For consistent programs, which
are those for which epistemic negation makes sense as some world view may exist, RAS re-
turns the same answer sets as AS (under very simple conditions, seen below) and therefore the
same world views. RAS however features, differently from AS, a prolog-like top-down query
answering facility (Costantini and Formisano 2016).
The paper is organized as follows. In Sections 2–3 we recall Answer Set Programming, and
Epistemic Logic Programs under the semantics of (Shen and Eiter 2016) (we assume a basic
knowledge on logic programming and its declarative and procedural semantics as illustrated
in standard textbooks, e.g., (Lloyd 1987)). Then, in Section 4 we propose some observations
on ELPs that will lead to an alternative approach to the computation of world view via epis-
temic scenarios. We introduce Resource-Based Answer set semantics in Section 5, and then
we show in Section 6 how by means of its associated query-answering device, RAS-XSB-
resolution (Costantini and Formisano 2016), we are able to query ELPs so as to check the va-
lidity of guesses, and to query world views and sets of world views. In Section 7 we expand
the case study introduced above, and finally we conclude. In this paper we discuss semantics
1 cf. (Bordini et al. 2006) for a survey about logical approaches to the definition of intelligent agents.
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and applications, but we treat implementation issues only in general terms. We intend in fact to
provide here novel contributions that can be of theoretical interest by themselves, and can also in
perspective be useful to developers and users of ELP programs and related applications. Coping
with efficiency issues and performing experiments is deferred to future work.
2 Answer Set semantics (AS) and Answer Set Programming (ASP)
“Answer Set Programming” (ASP) is a successful programming paradigm based on the Answer
Set Semantics (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1988; Gelfond and Lifschitz 1991). In ASP, one can see
an answer set program (for short, just “program”) as a set of statements that specify a prob-
lem, where each answer set represents a solution compatible with this specification. Whenever
a program has no answer sets (no solution can be found), it is said to be inconsistent, other-
wise it is said to be consistent. Several well-developed freely available answer set solvers ex-
ist (Brewka et al. 2016), that compute the answer sets of a given program. Syntactically, an ASP
programΠ is a collection of rules of the form ‘H ← A1, . . . , Am, not Am+1, . . . , not Am+n.’
whereH is an atom,m,n > 0, and eachAi, i ≤ m+n, is an atom. Atoms and their negations are
called literals. The left-hand side and the right-hand side of the clause are called head and body,
respectively. A rule with empty body is called a fact. A rule with empty head is a constraint,
where a constraint of the form ‘← L1, ..., Ln.’ states that literals L1, . . . , Ln cannot be simulta-
neously true in any answer set. Constraints are often rephrased as ‘f ← not f, L1, ..., Ln.’ where
f is a fresh atom. To avoid the contradiction over f , some of the Li’s must be false thus forcing
f to be false, and this, if achieved, fulfills the constraint.
There are other features that for the sake of simplicity we do not consider in this paper, namely:
(i) explicit disjunction; (ii) so-called classical negation ¬A, that can be however easily compiled
away (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1991); (iii) advanced programming features such as aggregates; (iv)
function symbols. In the rest of the paper, as it is customary in the ASP literature and as is done
in (Shen and Eiter 2016), we will implicitly refer to the “ground” version ofΠ, which is obtained
by replacing in all possible ways the variables occurring in Π with the constants occurring in Π
itself, and is thus composed of ground atoms, i.e., atoms which contain no variables.
The answer set (or “stable model”) semantics (AS) can be defined in several ways. How-
ever, answer sets of a program Π, if any exists, are supported minimal classical models of
the program interpreted as a first-order theory in the obvious way. The original definition by
(Gelfond and Lifschitz 1988) was in terms of the ‘GL-Operator’ Γ where, given set of atoms
I and program Π, ΓΠ(I) is the least Herbrand model of Π
I , where ΠI , called the (Gelfond-
Lifschitz) ‘reduct’ of Π w.r.t. I , is a positive program (and so its least Herbrand model can be
computed via the immediate consequence operator2 TP applicable to any positive program P )
obtained from Π by: 1. removing from Π all rules which contain a negative literal notA such
that A ∈ I; and 2. removing all negative literals from the remaining rules. I is an answer set
whenever ΓΠ(I) = I .
3 Epistemic Negation: Semantics
As discussed in the Introduction, we can understand Epistemic Logic Programs as answer set
programs augmented with the epistemic negation operator not. In this paper, for the semantics of
2 As already mentioned, for general terminology about logic programming a reader may refer to (Lloyd 1987)
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Epistemic Logic Programs we especially refer to the approach of (Shen and Eiter 2016), based
on the notion of World Views: for a given program, instead of a set of answer sets like in ASP,
there is now a set of such sets. Each one, called “world view”, consistently satisfies the epistemic
negations occurring in the given program (as well as the other modal expressions possibly defined
in terms of not). An epistemic logic program may admit none or several world views. World
views in (Shen and Eiter 2016) are obtained as follows. Let Π be a (ground) epistemic program
and let EP (Π) be the set of literals of the form not F occurring in Π. Given Φ ⊆ EP (Π),
the Epistemic reduct ΠΦ of Π w.r.t. Φ is obtained by: (i) replacing every not F ∈ Φ with true,
and (ii) replacing every not F 6∈ Φ with not F . Then, the set A of the answer sets of ΠΦ is a
candidate world view if every not F ∈ Φ is true w.r.t. A (i.e., F is false in some answer set
J ∈ A) and every not F 6∈ Φ is false (i.e., F is true in every answer set J ∈ A). We say that A
is obtained from Φ, or is corresponding to Φ, or that it is a candidate world view w.r.t. Φ, where
Φ is called a candidate valid guess. A is a world view if it is maximal, i.e., there exists no other
candidate world view obtained from guess Φ′ where Φ ⊂ Φ′, and we call Φ a valid guess. This
maximality condition, as discussed in (Shen and Eiter 2016), is essential for avoiding unintended
world views. A literal F is said to be true inΠ under the general epistemic semantics if Π admits
a world view A such that F is true in every answer set in A. The answer sets can be computed
by any variant of the answer set semantics while retaining all formal properties of the approach.
The work (Shen and Eiter 2016) thoroughly studies the complexity of the proposed semantics,
taking as a case study the FLP semantics of (Faber et al. 2011) for answer set programming,
and establishes that deciding whether a program has a world view is at the third level of the
polynomial hierarchy. They observe that complexity falls at the second level of the polynomial
hierarchy if one refers to classical AS semantics, i.e., if one excludes explicit disjunction and
additional programming constructs such as aggregates.
For the semantics of (Shen and Eiter 2016), the work (Bichler et al. 2018) proposes an inge-
nious method to compute and enumerate all the world views via an ASP solver. Precisely, they
define a metaprogramwhich has first a stage of guessing a truth assignment of epistemic literals,
and then a phase of checking. The method is effective, needs just one call to an ASP solver, and
it is also optimal from a complexity-theoretic point of view. As this encoding makes use of large
non-ground rules, specialized grounding methods must be adopted.
4 Observations
In this section we propose some observations concerning programs with epistemic disjunction
under the semantics of (Shen and Eiter 2016), applied however for the sake of simplicity to plain
AS semantics. Thus, the kind of programs that we consider are ASP programs where: (i) there is
no explicit disjunction in the head or body of rules; (ii) both default negation (that we indicate
with not ) and epistemic negation not may appear (only) in the body of rules; (iii) concerning
nested negations, we accept not not A (KA), not notA (MA), and not not notA (KnotA,
i.e., notMA), where A is an atom; we do not consider not notA for lack of space; (iv) like
(Shen and Eiter 2016), we do not explicitly consider classical negation ¬A.
Consider for instance the following programs, aimed to study how world views are formed in
similar though different significant cases.
Π1
a ← not b. b ← not d. d ← not b.
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Π2
a ← not b. b ← not d. d ← not b.
Π3
a ← not b, not b. b ← not d. d ← not b.
Π1 (involving no epistemic literals) has the unique world view {{b}, {a, d}} coinciding with
its set of answer sets. It can be easily verified that Π2 (involving the epistemic literal not b) has
the unique world view {{a, b}, {a, d}} as in fact there exists an answer set of the even cycle
involving b and c where b is false: this makes not b true, and therefore a can always be derived.
Instead,Π3 has the unique world view {{b}, {a, d}}, coincidingwith the one ofΠ1. This because
the presence of not b in the body of the first rule of Π3 makes literal not b completely irrelevant:
in fact, if we suppose that not b is true then the truth value of the head is determined by not b;
if not b is false then so is not b, as there can be no answer sets where b is false. Therefore, for
the sake of simplicity and without loss of generality we assume that the body of each rule may
include either not A or notA, where A is an atom, but not both. We assume also that K and M
are applied to atoms occurring as the head of some rule in given program. Otherwise in fact, KA
and MA are trivially false while their negations are trivially true.
It is important to notice that a given programmay admit multiple world views only in presence
of conflicting epistemic assumptions, like, e.g., in the example below:
a ← not b. b ← not a.
where in fact there are the two world views {{a}} and {{b}}. In the variant
a ← c. c← not b. b ← d. d← not a.
there are the two world views {{a, c}} and {{b, d}} where however the conflicting assumptions
are still not a and not b, as the positive dependencies are to all effects irrelevant.
In order to assess which are the guesses that can be sensibly made to find world views, we
propose the followingmethod: (a) simplifying the given program so as to put into evidence cycles
on epistemic literals; (b) finding the answer sets of such simplified version, and (c) extracting
potentially valid guesses from these answer sets. As we will show, if valid guesses exist they
correspond to some of these answer sets, whose number thus establishes an upper bound on the
number of valid guesses and consequently of world views.
Definition 4.1 (Epistemic simplified version of a program)
Given program Π including epistemic literals3, the epistemic simplified version of Π, that we
call Πs, is obtained via the following steps.
1. Preliminary step, for M and K elimination: replace each literal not notA with not A′,
where A′ is a fresh atom; cancel each literal not not A.
2. Simplification, composed of the following steps:
(i) Fold all positive dependencies internal to cycles, following the criteria pro-
vided in (Costantini and Provetti 2005); folding can be performed efficiently,
for instance by exploiting the techniques discussed in (Brass et al. 2001) 4.
(ii) Eliminate all rules with no epistemic literals in the body.
3 If given program does not contain epistemic literals then it admits a unique world view.
4 Folding techniques may lead to exponential growth of program size but this does not happen if they are applied only
inside cycles (cf. (Costantini and Provetti 2005)). We do not provide details about how such techniques are applied,
because the step of folding is not really necessary for the proposed method to work: it is performed here only for the
sake of clarity, in order to get rid of irrelevant non-epistemic literals and thus make Definition 4.2 (seen below) simpler.
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(iii) For each remaining rule ρ, substitute the conjunction of non-epistemic literals
in the body of the rule (if present) by a fresh atom aρ; for each such fresh
atom, add the fresh even cycle {aρ ← not noaρ. noaρ ← not aρ.} where
also noaρ is a fresh atom, to signify that the non-epistemic body of each rule
can be either true or false.
(iv) For each epistemic literal not C such that C does not occur in the head of any
of the rules of Πs as obtained in previous steps (i.e., not C is not involved in
cyclic dependencieswith other epistemic literals; notice that this case includes
the not A′ since A′ cannot occur in rule heads) substitute not C with fresh
atom NC and add the fresh even cycle {C ← notNC. NC ← notC.} to
signify that not C can be assumed or not.
(v) Substitute not with not .
After computing Πs (point (a) of the proposed method), we compute (point (b)) the answer
sets M1, . . . ,Mn of Π
s, and then (point (c)) we determine the potentially valid guesses related
to these answer sets. Since in buildingΠs the epistemic literals occurring in the original program
Π have been transformed so as to admit only not as negation, in this step we restore such literals
to their original form, and we get rid of the fresh atoms introduced in Πs.
Definition 4.2 (Epistemic scenarios)
Given programΠ and its epistemic simplified versionΠs, for each answer setsMi of Π
s, i ≤ n,
Si = {not A|A 6∈Mi} ∪ {not A|NA ∈Mi} ∪ {not notA|NA
′ ∈Mi} ∪
{not not A|A ∈Mi and not not A occurs in Π} ∪
{not not notA|A′ ∈Mi and not not notA occurs in Π}
We call the Sis the epistemic scenarios for Π, and S the set of such sets. We call SM the set
of maximal scenarios, i.e., SM = {Si ∈ S : ∄Sj ∈ S, Si ⊂ Sj}.
We can prove that:
Theorem 4.1
For every world viewA of a given programΠ with set of epistemic scenarios S, ifA is obtained
from guess Φ then Φ ∈ S.
Proof
(sketch) As it is well known, a programmay have several answer sets only if the program includes
cycles on negation. In fact, in a cycle such as a ← not b. b ← not a, only one of not a or not b
can be deemed to be true in each answer set (in absence of other rules supporting a or b or
both). The semantics of (Shen and Eiter 2016) computes world views by means of the epistemic
reduct, which is very similar to the (Gelfond-Lifschitz) reduct for computing answer sets, and
thus presents the same idiosyncrasies. In fact, consider, e.g., a cycle a← not b, aρ b← not a, bρ
where the fresh atoms aρ and bρ are assumed to be true. If making a guess including both not a
and not b (i.e., assuming both of them to be true) then both a and b would belong to any answer
set, thus determining a contradiction since both epistemic literals should then be false. So in this
case, each valid guess may involve either not A or not B, but not both. Thus, guesses which
can possibly be valid (and thus generate a world view) must include sets of epistemic literals not
conflicting with each other in cycles. Epistemic literals not involved in cycles are independent
of the others, and may thus be freely assumed as true/false in any guess. Assumptions on nested
negations follow in a straightforwardway from assumptions on not. In fact, the proposedmethod
determines the set S of potentially valid guesses on a simplified version of the program, obtained
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as specified in Definition 4.1. This simplified version is focused on epistemic literals though
faithful to the program intendedmeaning, and thus makes it possible to compute via plain answer
set computation all those guesses potentially corresponding to world views.
Corollary 4.1
Let n be the number of atomsA occurring in epistemic negations not A and n the number of rule
heads in the given program Π, and let nˆ be the number of rule heads occurring in its epistemic
simplified version Πs. The maximum number of valid guesses leading to world views of Π is
Θ(3nˆ/3), where we have Θ(3nˆ/3) ≃ Θ(3n/3) ≃ Θ(3n/3).
This follows from the famous result by (Cholewinski and Truszczynski 1999) on the maxi-
mum number of answer sets of a given program that, they show, depends on cycles over nega-
tion. In fact, the valid guesses are among the epistemic scenarios S, which are extracted from
the answer sets of Πs whose number is Θ(3nˆ/3). The cycles over negation in Πs correspond (by
Definition 4.1) to cycles over epistemic negations in Π, except for the addition of few fresh even
cycles that do not significantly increase the size of Πs w.r.t. the size of Π.
Our Contribution: Corollary 4.1 provides for the first time in the literature an upper bound on
the number of valid guesses.
Not all epistemic scenarios will in general correspond to valid guesses, as validity of a guess
will depend upon effective true/falsity of non-epistemic literals occurring in rules. Validity can
be verified as stated in (Shen and Eiter 2016) and mentioned in Section 3, or via the new method
introduced below in Section 6. Theorem 4.1 however allows one to reduce the number of guesses
to be considered. Though this cannot reduce complexity, it can nonetheless be of practical use-
fulness. Finding epistemic scenarios may provide in the average case (when not all guesses
are valid) an advantage if applied, e.g., as a pre-processing stage for the method proposed in
(Bichler et al. 2018). In fact, this methodmight thus consider, represent and check fewer guesses,
where each guess is represented by a long rule in the metaprogram that they adopt, and is there-
fore computationally heavy. Since however computing epistemic scenarios has a cost, the effec-
tive usefulness will have to be evaluated by experiments that assess “how small” n should be
in order to obtain an advantage. Or, one might allot a predefined threshold proportional to n to
the running time of the pre-processing stage, that would be stopped if exceeding this time: so,
pre-processing would bring either a substantial advantage or a negligible disadvantage.
5 Resource-based Answer Set semantics (RAS)
Resource-based Answer Set semantics (RAS, presented in (Costantini and Formisano 2015)) has
the property to provide answer sets to every program (so, under RAS there are no inconsistent
programs). The principles underlying the RAS semantics are the following: (i) atoms belonging
to a RAS answer set are either definitely true (i.e., a RAS answer set includes all atoms that are
true w.r.t. the well-founded semantics5), or have been rationally (though defeasibly) assumed
to hold; (ii) atoms not included in a RAS answer set are either definitely false (i.e., false w.r.t.
the well-founded semantics), or have been rationally assumed not to hold in order to draw some
5 The well-founded semantics (Van Gelder et al. 1991) provides to every program a unique three-valued model
〈W+,W−〉, where atoms in W+ are true, those in W− are false, and all the others are undefined. All atoms in
W+ are true in every AS answer set, and all atoms inW− are false; the answer set semantics (AS) in fact assigns, for
consistent programs, truth values to the undefined atoms, and so does RAS, though in a slightly different way.
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conclusion, or no judgment about them has been devised because any such assessment would lead
to contradiction. For instance, program {p ← not p.} has an empty RAS answer set because, in
our view, a rational agent cannot believe both not p and p, so no rational judgment on truth value
of p can be given; differently from AS, this is not seen as a reason not to provide a semantics.
Therefore, a RAS answer set: includes atoms either proved or assumed to be true; does not
contain atoms either proved or assumed to be false, or whose truth value cannot be assessed.
To formally explain the difference between AS and RAS we may resort to a modal logic
formulation. For AS, as discussed in (Marek and Truszczyn´ski 1993) an answer set programming
rule can be transposed, to express its logical meaning, into its “modal image”, where LA is
intended as “A is believed” under any modal logic contained in S5:
LA1 ∧ · · · ∧ LAn ∧ L¬LB1 ∧ · · · ∧ L¬LBm ⊃ LA (Ae0)
In RAS, as discussed in (Costantini and Formisano 2015), the logical meaning of each rule ρ
is expressed by the following couple of modal rules, that form its modal image:
LA1 ∧ · · · ∧ LAn ∧ L¬LB1 ∧ · · · ∧ L¬LBm ⊃ L A˙ (Ae1)
L A˙ ∧ ¬L¬LA ⊃ LA (Ae2)
(Ae1)modifies (Ae0) in the sense that, based on the same premises, one concludesLA˙, which
means that one believes to be enabled to prove A. (Ae2) states that LA is derived only if L A˙
holds, and one does not believe not to believe A. Thus, in the case for instance of the unary
odd cycle p ← not p which makes an ASP program inconsistent, by (Ae1) one from not p,
that in terms of the modal image is expressed as L¬Lp, can derive L p˙, i.e., to be enabled to
prove p. However, one cannot do so, as L¬Lp precisely accounts to believing not to believe p.
Consequently (Ae2) cannot be applied, and p therefore is false without raising inconsistencies.
Each AS answer set is also a RAS answer set, but a RAS answer set is not necessarily a classi-
cal model of the program. RAS answer sets are in fact all the “Maximal Consistently Supported”
(MCS) sets of atoms that a given programΠ admits. I.e., for each RAS answer setM ofΠ: every
atomA inM is consistently supported by a set S of rules ofΠ, where each rule in S is supported
in M , A is the head of exactly one rule in S, and each atom (positive literal) in the body of
rules in S is different from A, and is in turn consistently supported; moreover,M is maximal,
meaning that there exists noM ′ with the same properties such thatM ⊂ M ′. E.g., for program
{a← not b. b← not c. c← not a.}, the sets of atoms {a}, {b} and {c} are the only MCSs and
thus they are the RAS answer sets of this program. In fact, each of the composing atoms a, b, c’s
is consistently supported by set S consisting of the single rule of which that atom is the head
and the three sets are maximal, as all their supersets (among which are the classical models) are
not consistently supported. We made the examples of unary and ternary odd cycles because what
makes programs inconsistent under AS are indeed (direct or indirect) odd loops, i.e., when an
atom depends upon its own negation through an odd number of negative dependencies.
RAS answer sets of program Π can be computed via an operator ΓˆΠ which is analogous to
ΓΠ though it takes as input those interpretations I such that for every A ∈ I there exists rule
ρ in Π with head A, and is based upon: a modified reduct (that, with respect to the ‘traditional’
reduct recalled in Section 2, does not perform step 2), and a modified TΠ operator, that computes
consistently supported sets of atoms by discarding those atoms for which all possible derivations
depend on their own negation. In fact, as discussed before such atoms are excluded from any
RAS answer set because their truth value cannot be assessed. M = ΓˆΠ(I) is a RAS answer set
iffM ⊆ I andM is maximal, i.e., there is no proper subset I1 of I that determinesM
′ ⊃M .
On programs which are consistent under AS, ‘traditional’ answer sets are among RAS answer
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sets, that can be more numerous. E.g., program {a ← not b. b ← not a. p ← not p, a.} has
unique answer set {b} under AS and answer sets {a} and {b} under RAS. For AS, falsity of a is
required in order to bypass the odd cycle by falsifying p. For RAS this is no longer required, as
p is excluded from any answer set because it depends on its own negation. Odd cycles are in fact
the only possible source of difference between RAS and AS on programs which are consistent
under AS. For programs that are either ’call-consistent’ (i.e., they do not involve odd cycles)
or that fulfill straightforward syntactic sufficient conditions concerning odd cycles, the answer
sets returned by the two semantics are exactly the same. So, RAS can be seen as a variant of
AS. Sufficient conditions are based on the fact that, as discussed in (Costantini 2006), a program
including odd cycles can be consistent under AS only if for each odd cycle one of the following
conditions hold: (i) some rule involved in the cycle has conjuncts that, if false, force falsity of
the rule head or (ii) some atom involved in the cycle is the head of a rule outside the cycle
where conjuncts in its body, if true, force truth of the head atom; in both cases, the cycle is
’broken’ and becomes harmless, where these conjuncts are called “handles” of the cycle. Thus,
a first sufficient condition requires that atoms appearing in the handles of some odd cycle do
not occur, either directly or indirectly through dependencies, in other cycles or in their handles:
this in fact ensures that different cycles do not interact. A second sufficient condition, which is
more restrictive but easier to verify, requires that atoms occurring in handles of odd cycles do not
occur elsewhere in the program. In perspective, as future work it is possible to study and possibly
devise other, more fine-grained, sufficient conditions.
Differently from AS, RAS enjoys the properties that, ideally, every non-monotonic formalism
should enjoy (Dix 1995): (i) cumulativity, i.e., the possibility of asserting lemmas while keeping
the same answer sets; (ii) relevance, i.e., the fact that the truth value of each atom is determined
by the subprogram consisting of the relevant rules, which are those upon which the atom depends
(directly or indirectly, positively or negatively). AS does not enjoy such properties because some
atoms may be forced to assume certain truth values in order to prevent inconsistencies; this is no
longer the case for RAS. An advantage of the property of relevance is to make top-down query-
answering possible (Costantini and Formisano 2016) in prolog-style, i.e., without computing the
answer sets in advance but rather via an enhanced resolution procedure. This because in RAS
only the relevant rules have a role in proving/disproving any atom A. Instead, under AS a query
?A might locally succeed, but still, for the lack of relevance, the overall program may not have
answer sets includingA. Under RAS, a query ?A w.r.t. ground programΠ asks whetherA is true
in (belongs to) some answer set of Π. Query notA asks whether notA is true in some answer
set of Π, which implies that there exists some answer set to which A does not belong. Series
of queries can be, upon user’s choice: (i) contextual, i.e., query ?A,B asks whether A is true
(belongs to) some answer set, and B is true in (belongs to) some of those; (ii) independent.
RAS query-answering is performed (Costantini and Formisano 2016) via RAS-XSB-resolution.
It is implemented on top of XSB-resolution (Swift and Warren 2012; Chen and Warren 1993),
which is an efficient, fully described and implemented procedure, correct and complete w.r.t. the
well-founded semantics. Features of XSB-resolution that are crucial for the implementation of
RAS-XSB-resolution are negative cycles detection and the tabling mechanism, that associates
to program Π a table T (Π), which is initialized prior to posing queries. Such table contains in-
formation about true and false atoms useful for both the present and the subsequent queries (if
they are in conjunction). The principle of functioning for table T (Π) under RAS-XSB-resolution
are the following. During a proof: (a) the negation of any atom which is not a program fact is
available unless this atom has been proved; (b) the negation of an atomwhich has been proved be-
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comes unavailable, and the atom is asserted as true; so, (c) the negation of an atom which cannot
be proved remains always available. Since RAS-XSB-resolution is a top-down proof procedure,
modifications to the table might be undone and redone differently upon backtracking. The present
(prototype) implementation exploits XSB (or, more precisely, its basic version XOLDTNF), as a
“plugin” for definite success and failure, where new cases are added to manage atoms with truth
value undefined under XSB. RAS-XSB-resolution is correct and complete w.r.t. resource-based
answer set semantics, in the sense that, given a program Π, a query ?A succeeds under RAS-
XSB-resolution with an initialized T (Π) iff there exists some resource-based answer set M for
Π where A ∈M . The result extends to sequences of queries.
A consequence of rendering odd cycles consistent is that under RAS constraints must be de-
fined as such, since they can no longer be rephrased in terms of unary odd cycles. So, constraints
must be associated to the program as an additional layer. However, as RAS answer sets compu-
tation is a variant of answer set computation, constraints can still be checked during computation
as solvers usually do. In what follows, when clear from the context, we will call RAS answer
sets simply ‘answer sets’.
6 Epistemic Negation in RAS
It can be easily seen that the approach of (Shen and Eiter 2016) is applicable to RAS (in fact, the
approach has been devised in order to be applicable to any variant of the AS semantics). Indeed,
as seen in Section 3, after performing the epistemic reduct ΠΦ of given programΠ w.r.t. a guess
Φ, the set A of answer sets of ΠΦ is computed, which is a candidate world view to be checked
for validity and maximality. If, instead of computing the answer sets, one computes RAS answer
sets, or even if one adopts some other semantics which produces sets of sets as result, all the rest
remains unchanged. In fact, in Section 4 we have shown that epistemic scenarios can be found
by considering epistemic literals only.
In this Section we provide the following contributions:
1. We define a method to check validity of guesses without computing the world views, via
RAS query-answering.
2. We introduce more generally the possibility to query world views, and to query the
whole set of world views, and we define useful operators.
So, a reader can either suppose to adopt RAS instead of AS, or (s)he can assume that for any
given program Π the AS and RAS answer sets coincide (for instance, because Π fulfills one of
the above-mentioned sufficient conditions).
Consider first a program Π which does not contain epistemic negation. Its unique world view
will thus coincide with the set of its answer sets. Via RAS-XSB-resolution, we are able to imple-
ment epistemic queries, among which the following (where A is an atom):
• Query ?not A asks whetherA is false w.r.t. some answer set of Π, and therefore succeeds
if notA is true in some of them. This can be implemented via RAS query ?notA.
• Query ? not notA asks whether notA is false in some answer set, and therefore succeeds
if A is true in some of them, which corresponds to query ?MA. This can be implemented
via RAS query ?A.
• Query ?not not A asks whether it is not true that A is false w.r.t. some answer set of Π,
i.e., that A is true in all of them, which corresponds to ?KA. This can be implemented
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via RAS query ?A, notA(fail), where this overall query succeeds if ?A succeeds, i.e., A
belongs to some answer set of Π, whereas ?notA fails, so A is not false in any of them.
• Query ?not not notA asks whether A is false in every answer set, meaning KnotA, i.e.,
notMA. This can be implemented via RAS query ?A(fail) that succeeds if A fails, i.e.,
exactly whenever there is no answer set where A is true. We introduce a new operator
NOT as a shorthand for not not notA.
We will now proceed to consider programs including epistemic negation. We have seen in
Section 4 how to identify plausible guesses for given programΠ. Then one has to verify, for each
guessΦ, that it indeed corresponds to a world view. To check a guess under RAS, one can exploit
the following method, alternative to computing all the answer sets of ΠΦ.
Theorem 6.1 (RASCGK test: RAS Candidate Guess check)
Potential validity of a guess Φ w.r.t. program Π (i.e., the fact that Φ corresponds to a candidate
world view) can be checked as follows.
1. DeriveΠΦ as said in Section 3, i.e., (i) delete fromΠ all the epistemic literals belonging to
Φ and, (ii) for all the epistemic literals which occur in Π but are not in Φ, substitute each
of them with a fresh atom (a shortcoming for what done in (Shen and Eiter 2016), where
in such literals they substitute not with not, which accounts to considering them false).
2. Given ΠΦ: for every epistemic literal not A occurring in Π pose the query ?notA; for
every epistemic literal not notA occurring in Π, pose the query ?A; for every epistemic
literal not not notA occurring in Π, pose the query ?A(fail); and, for every epistemic
literal not not A pose the query ?A, notA(fail). Guess Φ is a candidate valid guess if all
queries concerning epistemic literals L ∈ Φ succeed, while instead all the others fail.
Proof
Straightforward given the above observations about the meaning of queries.
In order to establish validity of a guessΦ ∈ S, one has to establish thatΦ passes the RASCGK
test whereas no superset Φ′ ⊃ Φ with Φ′ ∈ S does. In order to find all valid guesses, one can
do the following: (i) check epistemic scenarios in SM (which are the largest ones); those which
pass the RASCGK test are valid guesses; (ii) for every Φ¯ ∈ SM which does not pass the test,
check via the RASCGK test every Φ¯′ ∈ S such that Φ¯′ ⊂ Φ¯ starting from the sets with greater
cardinality. Notice that the empty set may be a valid guess.
To implement world views querying, we exploit the tabling mechanism of XSB- and RAS-
XSB-resolution, that as mentioned associates to program Π a table T (Π), initialized prior to
program execution. In order to query the program under a certain valid guessΦ, the initialization
is customized accordingly, by setting to true all and only the epistemic literals occurring in the
valid guess under consideration.
Definition 6.1 (Guess-tailored table initialization)
Given program Π and a valid guess Φ, guess-tailored table initialization will be performed in
addition to normal initialization, in the following way: each epistemic literal occurring in Φ will
be set to true, and all the other epistemic literals will be set to false.
Definition 6.2 (G-RAS-XSB-Resolution)
The variant of RAS-XSB-resolution where, given program Π and valid guess Φ, guess-tailored
table initialization is applied is called G-RAS-XSB-resolution (tailored to Φ).
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Theorem 6.2
Given programΠ and a valid guess Φ, G-RAS-XSB-resolution tailored to Φ is correct and com-
plete w.r.t. the world view A obtained from Φ.
Proof
(sketch) RAS-XSB-resolution is correct and complete w.r.t. the answer sets of given program
Π. Thus, the RASCGK test is able to correctly establish whether a guess Φ is valid. Since a
world view consists of the (set of) answer sets of given programwhere however epistemic literals
belonging to valid guessΦ are deemed to be true and the other epistemic literals are deemed to be
false, and since guess-tailored table initialization does exactly so, then G-RAS-XSB-resolution
is correct w.r.t. the world view resulting from Π given Φ.
For instance, to check whether F is true in Π under the general epistemic semantics of
(Shen and Eiter 2016), i.e., to check whether F belongs to every answer set of a the world view,
it will suffice to issue the query ?KF to this world view.
Moreover, via a further extension one can be able to query the whole set of world views.
Definition 6.3 (Extended multi-view program)
Let Π be a program, and Φ1, . . . ,Φk be the valid guesses for Π. Let the extended multi-view
program ΠE be an extended program obtained as the union of k copies Π1, . . . ,Πk of Π, where
such copies have been however previously standardized apart, i.e., atoms occurring therein have
been suitably renamed. Let as assume for instance that each atomA inΠ becomes, inΠ1, . . . ,Πk,
respectivelyA1, . . . , Ak.
Definition 6.4 (Multi-guess table initialization)
Given program Π, given its associated valid guesses Φ1, . . . ,Φk, and given the extended multi-
view program ΠE , multi-guess table initialization will be performed by: performing guess-
tailored table initialization w.r.t. each Φ1, . . . ,Φk, where however these guesses have been pre-
viously standardized apart correspondingly to what done for ΠE ; i.e., each atom A occurring in
some literal of Φi (i ≤ k) becomes A
i.
Definition 6.5 (W-G-RAS-XSB-Resolution)
The variant of G-RAS-XSB-resolution where, given program Π and valid guesses Φ1, . . . ,Φk,
multi-guess table initialization is applied to ΠE , is called W-G-RAS-XSB-resolution (tailored to
Φ).
Now, by W-G-RAS-XSB-resolution it is possible to issue the following queries on given pro-
gram Π:
• Query ?KWA asks whetherA is true in all world views of Π. This query is translated into
query ?KA1, . . . ,KAk to be executed on ΠE (where comma stands for conjunction, i.e.,
for this query to succeed all conjuncts must succeed).
• Query ?MWA asks whether A is possible in some world view of Π. This query is trans-
lated into query ?MA1; . . . ;MAk to be executed on ΠE (where semicolon stands for
disjunction, i.e., for this query to succeed at least one disjunct must succeed). We might of
course modify MW so as to check whether A is possible in every world view, by substitut-
ing ‘;’ with ‘,’.
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• Query ? notWA asks whether A is false w.r.t. some world view of Π, and therefore if
notA is true in some of them. So, this corresponds to query ?notA1; . . . ;notAk to be
executed on ΠE (where semicolon again stands for disjunction).
• Query ?NOTW A asks whether A is false in every answer set of every world view, trans-
lated under W-G-RAS-XSB-resolution as ?NOTA1, . . . ,NOTAk.
This amounts to introducing new epistemic operators, that can be useful in practice as shown
by the example presented in the next section.
7 Case Study
In this section we will reconsider the example presented in the Introduction. Let us elaborate
on this example, stating that a person is guilty if a witness recognizes that person (say, when
perpetrating the crime):
guilty(X )← suspect(X ),witness recognizes(X ).
witness recognizes(X )← suspect(X ),witness1 recognizes(X ).
witness recognizes(X )← suspect(X ),witness2 recognizes(X ).
Assume to have the fact suspect(john).
Now, if we have also a fact, e.g., witness1 recognizes(john), then this will be true in every
answer set and thus guilty(john) will be provable. Assume instead that witness number one is
not sure, which can be represented as:
witness1 recognizes(john) ← notwitness1 not recognizes(john)
witness1 not recognizes(john) ← notwitness1 recognizes(john).
In this case, if we have no information about evidence provided by the other witness, then
innocent(john)will be provable, as there is an answer set where bothwitness recognizes(john)
and thus guilty(john) are false.
Assume now that we have witness1 recognizes(john). Assume that instead we have been
informed that witness2 recognizes(john) is false. So, we can state that the two disagree via a
fact disagree w1 w2 (john). If we do not want to give priority to any of the witnesses, in absence
of other information we may state:
guilty(X )← suspect(X ),witness recognizes(X ).
witness recognizes(X )← witness1 recognizes(X ), reliable(witness1 ,X ).
witness recognizes(X )← witness2 recognizes(X ), reliable(witness2 ,X ).
Whenever two witnesses propose contrary evidence on someone/something, then they cannot be
both reliable (concerning the situation at hand). This can be expressed as follows:
reliable(witness1 ,X ) ← disagree w1 w2 (X ),NOT reliable(witness2 ,X ).
reliable(witness2 ,X ) ← disagree w1 w2 (X ),NOT reliable(witness1 ,X ).
We use the new proposed operator NOT because not is too weak: it is not sufficient, to deem
a witness to be reliable, to state that the other one may be unreliable. In such case as this one
should seek certainty, i.e., NOT checks falsity in every answer set of a world view. Notice that
the above formulation results in a cycle on the operator NOT, namely, in abstract terms {a ←
NOT b. b ← NOTa.} which gives rise to alternative world views for exactly the same reasons
stated in Theorem 4.1 for not. So, at the present stage we have two world views:
{{suspect(john),witness1 recognizes(john), disagree w1 w2 (john),
reliable(witness1 , john),witness recognizes(john), guilty(john)}}
and
14
{{suspect(john),witness1 recognizes(john), disagree w1 w2 (john),
reliable(witness2 , john), innocent(john)}}
We can see that in the first world view john is guilty, while in the second one he is not. Here
we can appreciate the usefulness of the queries over the whole set of world views:
?KW guilty(john) asks whether john is guilty in every world view, and the answer is negative;
?MW guilty(john) asks whether john is possibly guilty in some world view, and the answer is
positive.
We can rephrase the original example as follows:
innocent(X )← suspect(X ), provably innocent(X ).
innocent(X )← suspect(X ), presumed innocent(X ).
provably innocent(X )← NOTW guilty(X ).
presumed innocent(X )← notW guilty(X ).
In this formulation, john is presumed innocent because there exists indeed a world view
where he is not guilty. However, he is not provably innocent because there will exist world views
where he is guilty. A court would deem john innocent in both cases. However, prior to court,
the law enforcement might decide for supplementary investigations (for instance, concerning
reliability of witnesses) in order to ascertain a conclusion ‘beyond any reasonable doubt’.
8 Conclusions
We have proposed alternative characterizations of ELPs (Epistemic Logic Programs), and we
have shown the usefulness of our approach in formalizing significant examples. Future direc-
tions include the extension of the approach so as to make the syntax of the programs that we
consider more general. An implementation is also in order, to replace the embryonic prototype
on which we have run the proposed examples. Then, experiments will be performed on suitable
benchmarks in order to assess the effective practical value of the approach.
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